Loading…
The Centre for Development of Telematics (C-DOT), the telecom R&D arm of the Department of Telecommunications, unveiled 14 indigenous quantum products in New Delhi on its 43rd Foundation Day.
The Quantum Product Series spans two distinct technology families: Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) systems and components, and Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) encryptors built on NIST's PQC algorithms.
Throughput ranges from 80 Mbps (Q-SETU, Layer 3) to 200 Gbps (Q-AMOGH, Layer 1 optical), with the defence-grade encryptors Q-VIKRAM and Q-PARAKRAM at up to 1 Gbps.
Two QKD systems were shown: Q-AKSHAY CD, a 1U fibre system using Coherent One Way and Differential Phase Shift protocols, and Q-AKSHAY MD, using the Measurement Device Independent protocol.
A Quantum Product Series booklet was released by Communications Minister Jyotiraditya M. Scindia in the presence of MoS Chandra Sekhar Pemmasani and Telecom Secretary Amit Agrawal.
Today's public-key cryptography (RSA, Diffie-Hellman, elliptic curve) is safe only because factoring very large numbers is computationally hard for classical machines. Shor's algorithm, published by Peter Shor in 1994, showed that a sufficiently large quantum computer could factor those numbers in polynomial time, which would break that entire family in principle. Two defences exist, and the C-DOT series carries both. QKD is a HARDWARE answer: it distributes an encryption key as quantum states of light over an optical fibre, and physics itself guards it, because the no-cloning theorem (proved by Wootters and Zurek in 1982) forbids an eavesdropper from copying an unknown quantum state, and any attempt to measure it disturbs it and shows up as errors. The first QKD protocol, BB84, was proposed by Charles Bennett and Gilles Brassard in 1984. PQC is a SOFTWARE answer: it keeps the classical internet architecture and simply replaces the vulnerable mathematics with problems (lattices, hash functions) that no known quantum algorithm solves efficiently. PQC needs no new fibre or detectors, which is why C-DOT's encryptors, IP phones and network nodes are all PQC-based while only the Q-AKSHAY family is QKD.
Simple Analogy: PQC is changing to a stronger lock on the same door. QKD is a courier whose envelope visibly tears if anyone opens it in transit.
Premier telecom R&D centre of the Department of Telecommunications; set up in August 1984 with operational autonomy to build indigenous switching and telecom technology. It also developed the Indian Counterfeited Device Restriction (ICDR) system used against fake IMEIs.
Nodal department for telecom policy, licensing and spectrum; administers the Telecommunications Act, 2023 and runs citizen platforms such as Sanchar Saathi
Issued the world's first post-quantum cryptography standards in August 2024 - FIPS 203 (ML-KEM, from CRYSTALS-Kyber), FIPS 204 (ML-DSA, from CRYSTALS-Dilithium) and FIPS 205 (SLH-DSA, from SPHINCS+). These are the algorithms C-DOT's encryptors implement.
Seed, nurture and scale up scientific and industrial R&D in quantum technologies and build a domestic quantum ecosystem; approved by the Union Cabinet on 19 April 2023 at a cost of Rs 6,003.65 crore for 2023-24 to 2030-31 under the Department of Science and Technology.
Key: Runs through four Thematic Hubs - Quantum Computing at IISc Bengaluru, Quantum Communication at IIT Madras with C-DOT, Quantum Sensing and Metrology at IIT Bombay, and Quantum Materials and Devices at IIT Delhi.
Replace RSA and elliptic-curve cryptography with algorithms that resist attack by large quantum computers, concluding a standardisation process begun in 2016.
Key: Three standards finalised in August 2024: FIPS 203 for key encapsulation (ML-KEM) and FIPS 204 and FIPS 205 for digital signatures (ML-DSA and SLH-DSA). Their adoption by C-DOT is what makes Indian products interoperable with global quantum-safe networks.
Incubate telecom and allied technology start-ups within C-DOT, giving them laboratory access and mentoring.
Key: Runs in cohorts, each closing with a demo day at which the incubated start-ups present their products.
| Aspect | Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) | Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) |
|---|---|---|
| Basis of security | Laws of quantum physics - no-cloning theorem, measurement disturbance | Mathematical problems believed hard even for quantum computers (lattices, hash functions) |
| Infrastructure needed | Dedicated optical fibre or free-space link, single-photon sources and detectors | None - runs as software on existing networks |
| What it protects | Distribution of the encryption key only | Key exchange, encryption and digital signatures |
| Distance limits | Limited by fibre loss; needs trusted nodes or quantum repeaters over long distances | No distance limit - travels wherever ordinary internet traffic goes |
| C-DOT products | Q-AKSHAY CD, Q-AKSHAY MD, C-SPD, C-RD | Q-SETU, Q-MAHASETU, Q-VIKRAM, Q-AMOGH, Q-DARSHAN, Q-VACHAN, Q-RAQSHAK, Q-VAAYU, Q-VAJRA1000, Q-PARAKRAM |
Adversaries can record encrypted traffic today and decrypt it once quantum computers mature. This is why governments migrate to quantum-safe cryptography years before a working cryptographically-relevant quantum computer exists - data with a long secrecy life is already at risk.
Shor (1994) breaks public-key cryptography by factoring integers in polynomial time. Grover (1996) only gives a quadratic speed-up on unstructured search, which weakens but does not break symmetric ciphers like AES - doubling the key length restores their strength. This asymmetry is why PQC targets public-key, not symmetric, algorithms.
C-DOT's indigenous 4G/5G core and now its quantum portfolio sit alongside the Production Linked Incentive scheme for telecom and networking products - the same policy logic of removing foreign dependence from critical network infrastructure.
Entangled photon pairs share correlations that no classical system can reproduce; entanglement-based QKD protocols use them to generate a shared key, and entanglement is the resource that future quantum repeaters would need to extend QKD beyond its present distance limits.
GS Paper 3 > Science and Technology > Developments in IT, Computers and Cyber Security
General Awareness > Science and Technology in Current Affairs
General Awareness > Defence Technology and Communications
Quantum technology has appeared repeatedly in general studies papers since the National Quantum Mission's approval in 2023.
A method of sharing an encryption key by encoding it in quantum states of light, where eavesdropping is physically detectable because measuring a quantum state disturbs it.
Classical algorithms based on mathematical problems that remain hard even for quantum computers, deployable on existing networks without new hardware.
Proved by Wootters and Zurek in 1982; an arbitrary unknown quantum state cannot be copied perfectly. This is the physical guarantee underlying QKD.
A 1994 quantum algorithm by Peter Shor that factors large integers in polynomial time, breaking RSA-type public-key cryptography in principle.
A QKD variant that removes attacks exploiting flaws in the detectors, by having both parties send states to an untrusted intermediate measuring station.