Economic Survey 2025-26 in full: FY27 growth 6.8-7.2%, FY26 at 7.4%, potential growth 7%, all 16 chapters, key numbers, new ideas, past Surveys and a quiz.
The Economic Survey 2025-26 was tabled in Parliament on 29 January 2026 by Union Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman, three days before the Union Budget 2026-27 of 1 February. It was prepared by the Economic Division of the Department of Economic Affairs under Chief Economic Adviser V. Anantha Nageswaran, who signed its Preface on the same day.
Its headline call: India's real GDP will grow 6.8 to 7.2 per cent in FY27, after an estimated 7.4 per cent in FY26. The Survey also raises its estimate of India's medium-term potential growth to about 7 per cent, from the 6.5 per cent it assessed three years earlier, and describes the outlook as one of "steady growth amid global uncertainty, requiring caution, but not pessimism".
The bigger argument sits in the Preface and the last chapter. India's strongest macroeconomic performance in decades has run into a world that "no longer rewards macroeconomic success with currency stability, capital inflows, or strategic insulation". The answer the Survey offers is a disciplined Swadeshi that moves from self-reliance to strategic resilience and finally to strategic indispensability, delivered by what it calls an entrepreneurial state.
Three numbers to carry into the exam hall
Every figure below is taken from the Survey itself or from the government's official highlights released with it. The period each number refers to is given in the last column — most are for FY25, or for the part of FY26 that was complete when the Survey went to print.
| Indicator | Figure | Period / as of |
|---|---|---|
| Real GDP growth projection | 6.8% to 7.2% | FY27 |
| Real GDP growth | 7.4% | FY26, First Advance Estimates |
| Real GVA growth | 7.3% | FY26, First Advance Estimates |
| Potential growth | About 7% (earlier 6.5%) | Medium term |
| Agriculture GVA growth | 3.1% | FY26, First Advance Estimates |
| Industry GVA growth | 6.2% | FY26, First Advance Estimates |
| Services GVA growth | 9.1% | FY26, First Advance Estimates |
| Private consumption (PFCE) | Grew 7.0%; 61.5% of GDP, highest since 2012 | FY26 |
| Gross fixed capital formation | Grew 7.8%; 30% of GDP | FY26 |
| Centre's fiscal deficit | 4.8% of GDP (budgeted 4.9%) | FY25 |
| Centre's fiscal deficit target | 4.4% of GDP | FY26 |
| Centre's revenue receipts | 9.2% of GDP | FY25 (Provisional Actuals) |
| Gross GST collections | ₹17.4 lakh crore, up 6.7% | April-December 2025 |
| Income tax returns filed | 9.2 crore (6.9 crore in FY22) | FY25 |
| Centre's effective capital expenditure | 4% of GDP | FY25 |
| States' combined fiscal deficit | 3.2% of GDP | FY25 |
| General government debt-to-GDP | Down about 7.1 percentage points | Since 2020 |
| Repo rate | 5.25%, after 100 bps of cuts in April-December 2025 | December 2025 |
| Cash reserve ratio | Cut by 100 bps to 3.0% | Phased, September-November 2025 |
| Gross NPA ratio of scheduled commercial banks | 2.2% (multi-decadal low) | September 2025 |
| Net NPA ratio of scheduled commercial banks | 0.5% (record low) | September 2025 |
| Bank credit growth | 14.5% (11.2% a year earlier) | 31 December 2025 |
| Headline CPI inflation | 1.7% average | April-December 2025 |
| Total exports (goods + services) | USD 825.3 billion, up 6.1% (record) | FY25 |
| Services exports | USD 387.6 billion, up 13.6% (all-time high) | FY25 |
| Remittances | USD 135.4 billion (world's largest recipient) | FY25 |
| Foreign exchange reserves | USD 701.4 billion; about 11 months of imports | 16 January 2026 |
| Current account deficit | USD 15 billion, 0.8% of GDP (1.3% in H1 FY25) | H1 FY26 |
| Gross FDI inflows | USD 64.7 billion | April-November 2025 |
| External debt | USD 746 billion | End-September 2025 |
| Rupee against the US dollar | Depreciated about 6.5% | 1 April 2025 to 22 January 2026 |
| Foodgrain production | 3,577.3 lakh tonnes, up 254.3 lakh tonnes | Agriculture year 2024-25 |
| Horticulture production | 362.08 million tonnes | 2024-25 |
| Installed power capacity | 509.74 GW, up 11.6% | November 2025 |
| Non-fossil share of installed power capacity | 51.93% | End-December 2025 |
| Renewable capacity added | 38.61 GW (solar 30.16 GW) | April-December 2025 |
| Persons employed (aged 15 and above) | 56.2 crore | Q2 FY26 |
| Multidimensional poverty (NITI Aayog) | 11.28% (55.3% in 2005-06) | 2022-23 |
| Global Innovation Index rank | 38th (66th in 2019) | 2025 |
The Economic Survey is the Finance Ministry's annual report card on the economy. It reviews the year gone by, assesses the outlook for the year ahead, and — in recent years — argues for particular lines of policy. It is the flagship document of the Ministry of Finance and is tabled in both Houses of Parliament during the Budget Session, before the Union Budget.
Economic Survey vs Union Budget
The Survey looks back and diagnoses; the Budget looks ahead and allocates. The Survey's FY27 growth range of 6.8-7.2% is real growth. The Budget's arithmetic rests on a nominal GDP assumption — Budget 2026-27 assumed 10% nominal growth — and the two should not be confused in an answer.
The Preface, written by the CEA, is the most quoted part of this Survey. It opens with what it calls the paradox of 2025: growth accelerated, inflation fell to record lows, the fiscal deficit target was beaten and three rating agencies upgraded India — yet the rupee underperformed. The Survey says the rupee's valuation "does not accurately reflect India's stellar economic fundamentals" and that it is "punching below its weight".
The reason offered is structural. India runs a goods trade deficit that its services surplus and remittances do not fully cover, so it depends on foreign capital. When those flows thin, the currency pays. The lasting fix, the Survey argues, is manufacturing competitiveness and exports, because "countries with strong, stable currencies are known for their manufacturing excellence".
| Scenario | What it looks like | Probability the Survey attaches |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Business as in 2025 | "Managed disorder" — the world stays integrated but distrustful; shocks cause volatility, not collapse; a thinner margin of safety | 40-45% |
| 2. Disorderly multipolar breakdown | Strategic rivalry intensifies, the Russia-Ukraine conflict stays unresolved, trade turns openly coercive, sanctions multiply, supply chains realign under political pressure | 40-45% |
| 3. Systemic shock cascade | Financial, technological and geopolitical stresses amplify one another — for example a correction in highly leveraged AI-infrastructure investment coinciding with geopolitical escalation. Consequences "could be worse than those of the 2008 global financial crisis" | 10-20% |
India's Power Gap
The Survey cites the Lowy Institute's Asia Power Index 2025: India ranks 3rd in overall power in Asia but 10th in economic relationships, and records a Power Gap of -4.0 — its realised influence falls short of what its resources would predict. The Preface notes this is the lowest in Asia, excluding Russia and North Korea.
The chapters were rearranged this year. The Preface says the order, "which previously relied on precedence, is now based on the depth and time-relevance of national priorities". Three chapters are special essays on medium- to long-term themes: artificial intelligence (Chapter 14), the quality of life in Indian cities (Chapter 15), and state capacity and the private sector in building strategic resilience (Chapter 16).
| No. | Chapter title | Core message |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | State of the Economy: Pushing the Growth Frontier | FY26 growth 7.4%; FY27 at 6.8-7.2%; potential growth raised to about 7%; introduces the Survey's nowcasting model |
| 2 | Fiscal Developments: Anchoring Stability through Credible Consolidation | Centre consolidated while raising capex; three rating upgrades in 2025; States' unconditional cash transfers flagged as a risk |
| 3 | Monetary Management and Financial Intermediation: Refining the Regulatory Touch | Banks' bad loans at multi-decadal lows; India's high cost of capital is a structural outcome of running current account deficits |
| 4 | External Sector: Playing the Long Game | Record exports and remittances; services cannot substitute for a goods-export ecosystem; push for global value chains and trade agreements |
| 5 | Inflation: Tamed and Anchored | Headline CPI inflation averaged 1.7% in April-December 2025, the lowest since the series began |
| 6 | Agriculture and Food Management: Raising Productivity, Securing Income and Ensuring Food Security | Record foodgrain output; horticulture, livestock and fisheries now drive farm growth |
| 7 | Services: From Stability to New Frontiers | Services at their highest-ever share of GVA (56.4%); India is the world's seventh-largest services exporter |
| 8 | Industry's Next Leap: Structural Transformation and Global Integration | Manufacturing recovery; PLI and semiconductor progress; competitiveness depends on innovation, skilling, logistics and MSME scale |
| 9 | Investment and Infrastructure: Strengthening Connectivity, Capacity and Competitiveness | Capex up 4.2 times since FY18; highways, rail, airports, power and telecom expansion; first-ever DISCOM profit |
| 10 | Environment and Climate Change: Building a Resilient, Competitive and Development-Driven India | 50% non-fossil capacity goal surpassed; argues for sequencing the transition without hurting energy security |
| 11 | Education and Health: What Works and What's Next | Enrolment and mortality gains; new focus on obesity, ultra-processed foods and digital addiction |
| 12 | Employment and Skill Development: Getting Skilling Right | 56.2 crore employed; four Labour Codes notified; gig and platform workers recognised |
| 13 | Rural Development and Social Progress: From Participation to Partnership | Poverty decline; VB-G RAM G Act replaces MGNREGS; SVAMITVA and SHG progress |
| 14 | Evolution of the AI Ecosystem in India: The Way Forward | A bottom-up, sector-specific AI strategy built on smaller models; proposes an AI Economic Council |
| 15 | Urbanisation: Making India's Cities Work for Its Citizens | Cities lack economic agency and own revenue; land, housing, mobility and sanitation are the binding constraints |
| 16 (Part I) | From Import Substitution to Strategic Resilience and Strategic Indispensability | Disciplined Swadeshi through a three-tier framework; a National Input Cost Reduction Strategy |
| 16 (Part II) | Building Strategic Resilience and Strategic Indispensability: The Role of the State, the Private Sector and the Citizens | State capacity is the binding constraint; deregulation; the private sector must stop seeking "negotiated shelter" |
16 chapters or 17?
Both numbers appear in the official documents. The Survey's website and its Highlights booklet number the chapters 1 to 16, with Chapter 16 in two parts. The CEA's Preface says the edition "has seventeen chapters", counting the two parts separately. If a question offers only one of the two, go by how the option is worded — "sixteen chapters, the last in two parts" is the precise description.
Why potential growth was raised to 7%
Economic Survey 2022-23 had assessed potential growth at about 6.5%, rising to 7-8% if reforms were sustained. This Survey's Box I.4 uses a growth-accounting (Cobb-Douglas) framework and credits three channels: capital accumulation (sustained capex, private investment revival, logistics reforms), labour input (formalisation, the Labour Codes, skilling) and total factor productivity (digital public infrastructure, regulatory simplification).
The warning on unconditional cash transfers
This chapter deals with State finances more than any recent Survey. It estimates States' spending on unconditional cash transfers, mostly to women, at about ₹1.7 lakh crore in FY26. The number of States running such schemes rose more than fivefold between FY23 and FY26, and about half of them are in revenue deficit. The Preface adds that with Indian bonds now in global indices, investors look at general-government finances: India's 10-year yield was 6.7% against Indonesia's 6.3%, though both are rated BBB.
Why capital is expensive in India
The Survey's deeper claim: India's high cost of capital is a structural macroeconomic outcome, not just a matter of policy rates or bank spreads. A country that persistently runs current account deficits and relies on foreign savings "must, by definition, pay a risk premium to global capital". The long-run task is to become a surplus-generating economy.
| Agreement | Year | Status at the time of the Survey (January 2026) |
|---|---|---|
| India-Mauritius CECPA | 2021 | In force |
| India-UAE CEPA | 2022 | In force |
| India-Australia ECTA | 2022 | In force |
| India-EFTA TEPA | 2024 | In force |
| India-UK CETA | 2025 | Yet to be implemented |
| India-Oman CEPA | 2025 | Yet to be implemented |
| India-New Zealand FTA | 2025 | Negotiations concluded |
| India-European Union FTA | 2026 | Negotiations concluded; awaiting ratification |
| Indicator | Earlier | Latest in the Survey |
|---|---|---|
| Centre's capital expenditure | ₹2.63 lakh crore (FY18) | ₹11.21 lakh crore (FY26 BE); effective capex ₹15.48 lakh crore |
| National highway network | 91,287 km (FY14) | 1,46,572 km (FY26, up to December) |
| Operational high-speed corridors | 550 km (FY14) | 5,364 km (FY26, up to December) |
| Rail network | — | 69,439 route km (March 2025); 99.1% electrified by October 2025 |
| Airports | 74 (2014) | 164 (2025) — world's third-largest domestic aviation market |
| Installed power capacity | — | 509.74 GW (November 2025) |
| Power demand-supply gap | 4.2% (FY14) | Nil (November 2025) |
| DISCOM AT&C losses | 22.62% (FY14) | 15.04% (FY25) |
| DISCOM profit after tax | Losses | ₹2,701 crore in FY25 — positive for the first time |
| Tele-density | — | 86.76%; 5G in 99.9% of districts |
| Rural tap water (Jal Jeevan Mission) | — | Over 81% of rural households (October 2025) |
Chapter 14 — Evolution of the AI Ecosystem in India
A bottom-up AI strategy
The Survey argues against chasing frontier-scale models. Smaller, task-specific models deployed across sectors spread innovation more evenly, lower entry barriers and suit India's diversity. Demand for AI in India is "emerging from real-world problems rather than speculative frontier uses" — healthcare, agriculture, urban management, education, disaster preparedness and public administration — with an appetite for systems that run on local hardware in low-resource settings. It proposes an AI Economic Council, separate from the governance council, to align AI deployment with education and skilling; its first principle is "human primacy and economic purpose".
Chapter 15 — Urbanisation
Making India's cities work for its citizens
The diagnosis is a governance deficit: cities lack economic agency. Indian cities raise less than 0.6% of GDP in own-source revenue, borrow negligibly and depend on transfers. The binding constraints are land, housing, mobility, and sanitation and waste management. The chapter asks for informality to be integrated rather than eradicated, and cites the Namo Bharat Regional Rapid Transit System as a model of how fast regional links reshape labour markets and support polycentric growth.
Chapter 16, Part I — From Import Substitution to Strategic Resilience and Strategic Indispensability
Disciplined Swadeshi
"Swadeshi is inevitable and necessary", but "not all import substitution is either feasible or desirable". The chapter sets out a three-tier framework for indigenisation and a National Input Cost Reduction Strategy that treats competitiveness as infrastructure. The destination is a world that moves from "thinking about buying Indian" to "buying Indian without thinking".
Chapter 16, Part II — The Role of the State, the Private Sector and the Citizens
State capacity as the binding constraint
State capability is treated as a human system of culture, skills and execution. The chapter covers the regulatory state, the private corporate sector's role in nation-building, citizens' norms, and State-level deregulation as "institutional capability in action". The Preface asks large companies to give up "the habit of seeking negotiated shelter" at the cost of downstream small firms.
| Tier | What falls in it | What policy should do |
|---|---|---|
| Tier I — Critical vulnerabilities with high strategic urgency | Goods and technologies whose denial would impose immediate national costs and whose global supply is highly concentrated: defence-critical systems, core infrastructure inputs, energy security components, public health essentials, foundational industrial technologies | Ensure assured availability under stress. Domestic production is justified even if initially costly — but the aim is minimum assured capacity within a set time, not permanent protection |
| Tier II — Economically feasible capabilities with strategic payoffs | Goods India could make at reasonable cost but still imports because of coordination failures, early scale disadvantages or procurement habits | Temporary, targeted support that is time-bound, performance-linked and tied to productivity, cost convergence and export readiness |
| Tier III — Low strategic urgency or high-cost substitution | Goods where import dependence creates no systemic vulnerability, supply is diversified, or substitution would cost the economy more than it protects | Indigenisation may be unwarranted. Manage risk through diversified sourcing, inventory buffers and contracts |
The RTI suggestion that made news
Box XVI.5, "The RTI Act: Transparency without Blindness", says the Right to Information Act, 2005 "may need re-examination, not to dilute its spirit". It floats three ideas for debate: exempting brainstorming notes, working papers and draft comments until they become part of the final record; protecting service records, transfers and confidential staff reports from casual requests; and a narrowly defined ministerial veto subject to parliamentary oversight. The Survey calls these "not prescriptions, but suggestions worth debating".
Examiners ask about a Survey's coinages as often as its numbers. These are the ideas that belong to the 2025-26 edition.
| Term | What it means in the Survey |
|---|---|
| Strategic indispensability | The final stage of the Swadeshi progression: India embedded so deeply in global systems that the world buys Indian "without thinking" |
| Strategic resilience | The middle stage — the ability to withstand denial of critical inputs |
| Disciplined Swadeshi | Indigenisation chosen by a three-tier test of strategic urgency and economic feasibility, not blanket import substitution |
| National Input Cost Reduction Strategy | Treating affordable, reliable inputs — energy, freight, capital — as competitiveness infrastructure |
| Entrepreneurial state | Mariana Mazzucato's phrase: a state that acts under uncertainty, structures risk, experiments and corrects course |
| Strategic sobriety | The recommended policy stance for 2026, as against "defensive pessimism" |
| Paradox of 2025 | Strong macroeconomic performance that did not earn currency stability or capital inflows |
| Managed disorder | The Survey's best-case global scenario for 2026 |
| Systemic shock cascade | The worst-case scenario, where financial, technological and geopolitical stresses feed one another |
| Power Gap | Lowy Institute measure of the difference between a country's expected and realised influence; India's is -4.0 |
| Negotiated shelter | Protection that large firms seek from import competition, at the expense of downstream MSMEs |
| AI Economic Council | A proposed body to align AI deployment with jobs, education and skilling |
| Nowcasting model | The Survey's in-house tool that uses high-frequency indicators to estimate current-quarter growth |
| Unconditional cash transfers (UCTs) | State cash schemes, mostly for women — about ₹1.7 lakh crore in FY26 — flagged for crowding out capital spending |
| Shreya and Preya | The enduring good versus the fleeting comfort, from the Katha Upanishad; the Survey's closing metaphor |
A Survey is a January snapshot. Its FY26 figures were First Advance Estimates on the old 2011-12 base; the national accounts moved to a new base year, 2022-23, on 27 February 2026, so later numbers are not strictly comparable.
Economic Survey 2025-26 tabled. FY26 growth 7.4% (First Advance Estimates); FY27 projected at 6.8-7.2%.
Union Budget 2026-27 presented. Fiscal deficit target 4.3% of GDP for FY27; nominal GDP growth assumed at 10%.
New GDP series with base year 2022-23 released. Second Advance Estimate puts FY26 growth at 7.6%.
Controller General of Accounts' provisional accounts: the Centre meets the 4.4% fiscal deficit target for FY26, as the Survey expected.
Provisional Estimates: FY26 real GDP growth 7.7% on the new base; Q4 at 7.8%; nominal growth 8.9%.
Q1 FY27 real GDP growth estimated at 7.8% — above the top of the Survey's 6.8-7.2% range for the full year.
| Survey | Tabled on | Growth projected for the next year | Current-year growth it cited |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2021-22 | 31 January 2022 | 8.0-8.5% for FY23 | 9.2% for FY22 (First Advance Estimates) |
| 2022-23 | 31 January 2023 | 6.5% baseline for FY24 (range 6.0-6.8%) | About 7% for FY23 |
| 2023-24 | 22 July 2024 | 6.5-7% for FY25 | 8.2% for FY24 |
| 2024-25 | 31 January 2025 | 6.3-6.8% for FY26 | 6.4% for FY25 |
| 2025-26 | 29 January 2026 | 6.8-7.2% for FY27 | 7.4% for FY26 (First Advance Estimates) |
| Chief Economic Adviser | Tenure |
|---|---|
| Raghuram Rajan | 10 August 2012 - 4 September 2013 |
| Arvind Subramanian | 16 October 2014 - 20 June 2018 |
| Krishnamurthy V. Subramanian | 7 December 2018 - 7 December 2021 |
| V. Anantha Nageswaran | 28 January 2022 - present (term extended in February 2025 up to 31 March 2027) |
Nageswaran's Surveys
Economic Survey 2025-26 is the fourth prepared under V. Anantha Nageswaran, after 2022-23, 2023-24 and 2024-25. He took office on 28 January 2022, three days before the 2021-22 Survey was tabled.
The Survey projects India's real GDP growth for FY27 (2026-27) in the range of 6.8 to 7.2 per cent. For FY26 it cites the First Advance Estimates of 7.4 per cent real GDP growth and 7.3 per cent GVA growth.
Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman tabled it in Parliament on 29 January 2026, three days before the Union Budget 2026-27 of 1 February 2026.
The Economic Division of the Department of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Finance, under the guidance of Chief Economic Adviser V. Anantha Nageswaran. It is his fourth Survey.
The official website and Highlights booklet number sixteen chapters, with Chapter 16 split into two parts. The CEA's Preface counts those parts separately and says the Survey has seventeen chapters. It comes as one volume plus a Statistical Appendix.
About 7 per cent over the medium term. The Survey revised it up from the 6.5 per cent assessed in Economic Survey 2022-23, crediting capital accumulation, greater labour input and productivity gains from reforms.
A test for deciding what to make at home. Tier I covers critical vulnerabilities with high strategic urgency, where domestic capacity is justified even at a cost. Tier II covers goods India can make competitively with time-bound support. Tier III covers goods where import dependence poses no real risk and substitution is not worth the cost.
No. It is a convention dating from 1950-51 and has no constitutional or statutory mandate; the government is not bound by its recommendations. The Union Budget, by contrast, is required by Article 112.
Headline CPI inflation averaged 1.7 per cent in April-December 2025, the lowest since the CPI series began, mainly because food and fuel prices — 52.7 per cent of the basket — fell. The Survey expects some firming ahead.