The Tenth Schedule, added by the 52nd Amendment (1985), disqualifies legislators who defect from their party; the Speaker or Chairman decides.
The Tenth Schedule of the Constitution, popularly called the Anti-Defection Law, lays down when a Member of Parliament or of a State Legislature is disqualified for defecting from the party on whose ticket they were elected. It was inserted by the 52nd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1985 to end the 'Aaya Ram Gaya Ram' politics of floor-crossing that had toppled several State governments from the late 1960s. A member is disqualified for voluntarily giving up party membership or for defying the party whip in a vote. The Speaker (Lok Sabha / Assembly) or Chairman (Rajya Sabha / Council) decides disqualification petitions, subject to judicial review. The 91st Amendment, 2003 tightened the law by removing the 'split' exception.
Type: LawParty members (Para 2(1)) — disqualified if they voluntarily give up membership of their party, or vote/abstain in the House contrary to the party's direction without prior permission, unless the party condones it within 15 days.
Independent members (Para 2(2)) — disqualified if they join any political party after the election.
Nominated members (Para 2(3)) — disqualified if they join a political party after six months from taking their seat; they may join one within those six months.
Merger exception (Para 4) — no disqualification when the original party merges with another and at least two-thirds of the legislature party agree to it.
Presiding officers (Para 5) — a Speaker, Deputy Speaker, Chairman or Deputy Chairman who gives up party membership on election to that office is not disqualified.
Deciding authority (Para 6) — the Chairman or Speaker of the House decides; Kihoto Hollohan (1992) held this decision is open to judicial review.
Split exception deleted — the original Para 3 protected a 'split' by one-third of a legislature party; the 91st Amendment, 2003 omitted it.
Tenth Schedule (Paras 1-8)
Grounds of disqualification, merger exception, presiding-officer exemption, decision by Speaker/Chairman, rule-making
Article 102(2) and Article 191(2)
A person disqualified under the Tenth Schedule is disqualified from being a member of Parliament / a State Legislature
Article 75(1A) and (1B)
Union Council of Ministers capped at 15% of Lok Sabha strength; a disqualified defector cannot be made a Minister until re-elected or the term ends (91st Amendment)
Article 164(1A) and (1B)
State Council of Ministers capped at 15% of the Assembly, but not fewer than 12; same bar on disqualified defectors (91st Amendment)
Article 361B
A member disqualified for defection is barred from holding any remunerative political post (91st Amendment)
52nd Amendment Act, 1985
Inserted the Tenth Schedule
91st Amendment Act, 2003
Deleted the one-third split exception (Para 3) and added the ministry-size caps and Article 361B
Defections became endemic after the 1967 general elections, when frequent floor-crossing brought down State governments; the phrase 'Aaya Ram Gaya Ram' came from Haryana MLA Gaya Lal's repeated party switches in 1967. Parliament responded with the 52nd Amendment in 1985. Its one-third 'split' exception was then used to legitimise group defections, so the 91st Amendment removed it in 2003. Since then the main battleground has been the Speaker's role — delays in deciding petitions and questions of partisanship.
52nd Amendment inserts the Tenth Schedule.
Dinesh Goswami Committee on electoral reforms recommends limiting disqualification to voluntarily giving up membership and voting against the party on confidence/no-confidence motions, with the President/Governor deciding on the Election Commission's advice.
Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu: Tenth Schedule upheld; Speaker acts as a tribunal subject to judicial review; Para 7 struck down.
Ravi S. Naik v. Union of India: 'voluntarily giving up membership' can be inferred from conduct — formal resignation is not needed.
G. Viswanathan v. Speaker, Tamil Nadu Assembly: an expelled member continues to belong to the party for Tenth Schedule purposes; joining another party after expulsion is voluntary giving up of membership.
Law Commission's 170th Report on electoral reforms recommends strengthening intra-party democracy.
91st Amendment deletes the split exception; caps ministry size at 15%; inserts Article 361B.
Nabam Rebia (Arunachal Pradesh): a Speaker facing a notice for removal should not decide disqualification petitions.
Keisham Meghachandra Singh (Manipur): Speakers should decide petitions within three months; Court suggests an independent tribunal.
Subhash Desai (Maharashtra, 11 May): the whip is appointed by the political party, not the legislature party; 'split' is no longer a defence; Nabam Rebia referred to a larger bench.
Padi Kaushik Reddy v. State of Telangana (31 July): three-month deadline for the Telangana Speaker; the Speaker has no Article 122/212 immunity when deciding; Parliament urged to reconsider the Speaker's role.
February: the Supreme Court gives the Telangana Speaker a final three-week deadline on the pending petitions, warning of contempt.
Speaker (Lok Sabha / Legislative Assembly)
Decides disqualification petitions against members of that House under Para 6
Chairman (Rajya Sabha / Legislative Council)
Decides petitions against members of the Upper House
Supreme Court and High Courts
Judicial review of the presiding officer's decision (Kihoto Hollohan); can set time limits for deciding petitions
Election Commission of India
Recommended by reform committees (Dinesh Goswami, 2nd ARC) as the advisory body to the President/Governor in place of the Speaker
The law brought stability to governments by making floor-crossing costly, and it honours the voter who chose a party, not just a candidate. Its critics point to three problems. Legislators lose the freedom to vote their conscience on any issue, because every vote is whip-bound. Group defections still happen through the merger route or through mass resignations. And Speakers, who are party members, have delayed or decided petitions in partisan ways. This is why the Supreme Court has repeatedly set three-month time limits and asked Parliament to consider an independent tribunal.
Tenth Schedule = Anti-Defection Law; 52nd Amendment, 1985.
Grounds: voluntarily giving up membership; defying the whip (unless condoned within 15 days).
Independent joins a party = disqualified; nominated member gets 6 months.
Merger exception: two-thirds of the legislature party. One-third split deleted by the 91st Amendment, 2003.
Speaker/Chairman decides; judicial review allowed (Kihoto Hollohan, 1992).
91st Amendment: Articles 75(1A), 164(1A) (15% cap, minimum 12 in States) and 361B.
Three-month limit: Keisham Meghachandra Singh (2020), Padi Kaushik Reddy (2025).
Whip is chosen by the political party, not the legislature party (Subhash Desai, 2023).
The 52nd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1985 inserted the Tenth Schedule. The 91st Amendment, 2003 later removed its 'split' exception.
The Speaker of the Lok Sabha or Assembly, or the Chairman of the Rajya Sabha or Council. Since Kihoto Hollohan (1992) the decision is open to judicial review.
Yes. Members are not disqualified if their original party merges with another and at least two-thirds of the legislature party agree to the merger (Para 4).
The Tenth Schedule itself sets none. The Supreme Court has said petitions should be decided within three months (Keisham Meghachandra Singh, 2020; Padi Kaushik Reddy, 2025).