The contrast between 213 GW of module capacity and zero domestic polysilicon is the core of this story. A country can assemble panels at very large scale and still be strategically exposed, because the entire chain rests on an imported input sourced overwhelmingly from China. That exposure is not merely commercial: any disruption to polysilicon supply would idle downstream capacity regardless of how much of it exists. The MNRE Secretary's reasoning for a separate scheme is worth noting — polysilicon should be treated as a distinct industrial activity because it is also used in the semiconductor industry, so investment in it serves two strategic sectors rather than one. The counterweight is that polysilicon production is capital-intensive, energy-intensive and technically demanding, with established producers operating at a scale that makes new entrants hard to justify commercially. That is precisely the situation a production-linked incentive is designed for, since it ties public support to measured incremental output rather than to upfront capital.